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European Perspectives: A Foreword
.By DETLEV

F. VAGTS*

Our authors perform a valuable service for American corporation
lawyers by presenting us a picture of the corporate responsibility question as seen from European perspectives. It is a significant addition to
the limited number of writings that shed real light on the ways in which
the different legal traditions of the industrialized nonsocialist powers
have tried to organize and channel large-scale private economic activity. To each of those systems of law the modem corporation poses a
puzzling set of challenges: How can one obtain economic efficiency
from large productive units? How can one, at the same time, prevent
those entitities from spinning off negative externalities as their impact
on their surroundings grows? Finally, how can we accomplish those
ends without setting up such an elaborate system of signals, checks,
balances, and reviews as to stifle all activity? As Professor Schmitthoff
shows us, comparative corporation law has been a productive and practical exercise within Europe; it may become a transatlantic activity as
well.1 As we proceed with conferences, hearings, symposia, and even
rules 2 on "corporate governance" (as the topic has become known) we
will need all the guidance we can get from our foreign peers.
Professor Roth has done us a special service by describing systematically and with great economy of language the modes through which
society attempts to steer corporations in the direction of the public interest. 3 As one goes through the list one sees that we and the Europeans have put our emphasis in different places. In the past, the United
*
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1. For a detailed description of the earlier history of this development, see E. STEIN,
HARMONIZATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAWS: NATIONAL REFORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION (1971).
2. For a summary of reactions to the SEC's call for comments on corporate governance, see [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,653.
3. By way of comparison one thinks of the much more elaborate and abstract treatment of alternatives in C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICALECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977). For European-American comparisons, see A. SHONFIELD,
MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER (1965).
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States has given a critical role to formal regulation, both by industryoriented agencies such as such as the ICC, CAB and FCC, and by purpose-oriented agencies such as those controlling pollution, consumer
safety, and environmental pollution. Looking at the performance of
these agencies, we have come to have doubts. We see the mountains of
costly paperwork involved. We see projects delayed for years by proceedings that grind remorselessly through courts and agencies. We find
industry growing soft and noncompetitive under the shield of agencies
that have acquired parental feelings about their charges. For such reasons we have tried painfully to prune some of the excesses of regulatory
action. We would still feel uncomfortable with the private, informal
governmental-guidance processes more natural on the continent. We
still find such relationships insufficiently visible, controllable, and definable. The example of the socialist countries is one that attracts virtually no American analysts and, as Professor Schmitthoff shows, very
few Europeans.
The proper subject of corporation law, however, is not control by
outside agencies, but rather control embedded within the internal managerial structure of the corporation. American lawyers have watched
with some trepidation the fact that Germany has not only survived but
prospered while harboring as curious an aberration as co-determination. That concern has been heightened by an awareness that Great
Britain, seeking relief from its industrial problems, which include labor
restiveness and slack in the managerial system, has been giving serious
consideration to importing the institution into its own law.
Professor Schmitthoff sketches for us the prospects of change in
that common-law country. At the same time the new German amendment, advancing labor representation to a position of parity, warns
management that a first step towards co-determination may lead to further encroachment on its power position. Thus far I have not detected
any enthusiasm for this institution among American managers and not
very much in union circles. The habit of adversary relations between
4
capital and labor is too deeply rooted to be easily displaced.
Professor Roth leans towards a drastic solution for the problem of
reconciling the conflicting interests at stake in the process of corporate
management. He would deprive the shareholders of their legal claim to
select corporate management and turn managerial power over to independent trustees. Bringing down to date the Berle-Means conclusion
4. My views as of an earlier time appear in Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectivesfrom the German, 80 HARv. L. REV. 23 (1966).
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that shareholder control in the "modem" corporation is an ineffective
pretense, he concludes that such a change would not be a significant
sacrifice for the shareholders. Furthermore, it would clear the way for
a disinterested decisionmaker to make the difficult choices between interests free from an exclusive fiduciary tie to the shareholders.
With all respect, I-have doubts about each of these propositions.
Professor Roth has focused his previous work on investment companies
and may have tended to over-extrapolate his findings. The shareholders of mutual funds-particularly closed-end-seldom resort to the
vote to cope with management. For one thing, the real manager is not
directly subject to their vote but is tied to the fund by an investment
advisory contract; voting the manager out would involve first a change
in the rather nominal board of the fund so as to obtain a board that will
terminate the contract agreement. For another, the remedy of selling
out is a relatively effective one; shrinkage of the amount invested in the
fund has quite direct economic effects on the managers. In an ordinary
manufacturing corporation, the shareholders' position is more complex.
I am persuaded by the Eisenberg analysis, that as to corporations
other than AT&T and a few analogous giants, shareholder revolts are a
realistic possibility.5 When one takes into account the blocks held by
individual families and institutions, one sees that at many corporations
there are nuclei that could support a purge. Alongside that factor one
notes the possibility that managerial inadequacy will depress the market price of the corporation's stock to the point where it is attractive to
make a tender offer in order to take over control. While it is relatively
uncommon to combine a tender with a proxy fight as in the Curtiss
Wright-Kennecott situation, 6 the tender offer would make no sense at
all if the successful tenderer, as holder of the controlling shares, did not
have the power to displace management. Without either the tender offer or the proxy fight to fear, the independent trustee could defy the
shareholders. Thus, the proposed change would impact heavily on
shareholders and lead to the loss of much of the value of their
investment.
This would be a strange time at which to impose such a sacrifice.
The lot of the holder of equity securities since 1973 has been a harsh
one. In the United States, millions of shareholders have deserted the
stock market, the market value of stocks as calculated by the Dow
5. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1976).
6. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,565 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 1978).
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Jones index has declined drastically during the period since 1973 when
simply holding even with inflation would have required a very substantial increase, 7 and the price of assets obtained through the purchase of
stock has sunk so far below the price of reproducing them directly that
tender offers have become the fashion.
All of this has, naturally, had devastating effects on the market for
new equity securities. Thus, the case is strong for the proposition that
the present weak point in the capitalist system is the vulnerable position of the capitalists themselves and not the danger that excessive concentration on profit maximizing will lead to injury to other interests.
Merely perfecting the provision of information about the desperate situation would not do much to cure those problems. Perhaps this is an
American-centered view; it could be argued that Europe has begun
only very slowly to impose by government decree restrictions in the
interest of the environment, consumer safety, etc. Thus, there may be
more room left for social responsibility as a restraint on the excesses of
enterprise.
Nor am I optimistic about the ability of a trustee to reconcile or
trade off the claims of the various parties interested in a corporation.
We are familiar with the problems trustees have in reconciling the
rather straightforward conflicts between life tenants and remaindermen. 8 Although these problems tend to fall into repetitive categories,
trustees have had to seek judicial instructions on many occasions. It is
hard to see how trustees would decide how much to expend on
air-pollution control equipment-at what expense to their workers' salaries and to their stockholders' dividends?
What they would do would depend to a large degree on who appointed them. If, as seems very possible, the gap would be filled by a
public-interest trustee we would have a situation to which the closest
analogy would be our experience with directors who represent the
United States government on corporate boards. They have certainly
had difficult roles to play because of the dual character of their responsibilities. Of these I am most familiar with the work of the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).9 This body was established to
take over the portfolio of insurance against foreign expropriation that
7. According to one calculation, $.90 invested in the Dow stocks in 1965 would have
shrunk by late 1977, by virtue of inflation and the market, to S.44. TIME, Aug. 29, 1977, at
44.
8. See 2 A. ScoTT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 183 (3d ed. 1967); 3 id § 232.
9. See Griffin, Transfer of OPIC'sInvestment Insurance Programsto PrivateInsurers:
Prospects and Proposals,8 LAW & PoL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 631 (1976).

May 1979]

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES: A FOREWORD

had been built up by various branches of the United States government. It has had much difficulty in trying to decide whether to behave
like an insurance company or a development-assistance organization.
Congress has hoped that it could, with the assistance of Lloyd's and
other private underwriters, put the risk on a strictly actuarial basis. At
the same time it has sent OPIC signals that it should put more stress on
poorer countries, on enterprises that will not export to the United
States, on small corporations, etc. Each of these runs counter to the
instincts of the business executive. Without being critical of those who
manage OPIC, one comes to believe that they have an impossible assignment. One suspects that Professor Roth's trustees would be equally
bewildered by the messages that come to them.' 0

10.

I have made much the same comments in reviewing the rather similar proposals

made in C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975). Vagts, Book Review, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 635 (1976).

